Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s m Wians – – Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society (Plato 12 ()). Dominic Scott has produced a monograph on the Meno that in its fluency and succinctness does justice to its subject and, like its subject. Buy [(Plato’s Meno)] [Author: Dominic Scott] published on (March, ) by Dominic Scott (ISBN:) from Amazon’s Book Store. Everyday low prices and free.
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Indeed, it is just before the alleged change in Meno that Socrates is at pains to emphasize that Meno has not changed, that, on the contrary, wishing to hold onto his freedom cf. Plato’s Meno Dominic Scott No preview available – Robin Waterfield – dlminic Heythrop Journal 48 4: The second unifying theme that Scott identifies is Meno’s moral progress and education.
They are not, however, instrumental. True, Socrates describes Meno as undisciplined in the speech that leads into his introduction of the wcott of hypothesis 86d3-e4, quoted by Scott on pp.
Edited with Odminic and Commentary. Rightly or wrongly, Meno just wants to get on with investigating how virtue is acquired. His previous publications include Recollection and Experience: Dominic Scott – unknown.
Bryn Mawr Classical Review
It seems to me more natural to see this as a sign not of resentment on Meno’s part but a kind of amazed bewilderment that characterizes the stingray speech as a whole — this is surely the force of his prediction that Socrates might be arrested “as a wizard” 80b6 should he leave Athens.
Perhaps it is only someone with Socrates’ one-track mind who would regard Meno’s desire to continue addressing the practical question as a sign of ill discipline. Second, Socrates in the Meno seeks no more than the virtue common dokinic all human beings–he surely would not hold that the virtue of, say, a knife, involves justice and temperance.
Heffer, Originally Macmillan, Science Logic and Mathematics. The assumption that we should determine what virtue is before dominid whether it is teachable is not made the subject of a serious philosophical challenge either. In the Menoas in other dialogues, it is not the interlocutor who changes, but Socrates.
Plato’s Meno // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
Scott himself dminic it be only partially successful, and uses this as another stick with which to beat Meno for not “appreciating its real significance” ibid. Scott is surely incorrect to understand “would be able to do the same” as “would be able to become as expert as anyone” .
Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s Meno. Is this mere coincidence? Its treatment of these, though profound, is tantalisingly short, leaving the reader with many Scott speaks of his “hesitation” 30but this may betoken thoughtfulness rather than stupidity.
That he resists its application to the case of virtue must signal, then, something other than his rejection of it. It is Socrates who adapts to his interlocutor and tries taking a more obliging and conciliatory approach in the second round.
But, indeed, this is something we should expect since Socrates says at 98a5: This supposedly demonstrates his “obtuseness” ibid. Selected pages Title Page.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. Most notably, he dares to specify the views of the historical Socrates and vigorously defends the contention that the Meno predates the Gorgias.
Dominic Scott: Plato’s Meno.
User Review – Flag as inappropriate Very interesting and inspiring. Abandon it and we are free to observe Meno, without strain, as an imperfect but relatively decent interlocutor capable of reacting in a variety of different ways to various aspects of his encounter with Socrates.
Nor, on the other hand, is Meno particularly stupid or badly behaved, though he would need to be for Scott to succeed in portraying him doninic failing to grasp the import of his own contributions. Even with the second feature we have rather a mixed bag.
In a new departure, this book’s exploration focuses primarily on the content and coherence of the dialogue in its own right and not merely in the context of other dialogues, making it required reading for all students of Plato, be they from the world of classics or philosophy. There is much richness and insight in Scott’s interpretation of the Meno that I have not commented on.
On Scott’s view, Socrates answers Meno’s challenge by maintaining that whereas inquiry begins with opinions held at the conscious level–that is, with mere opinions that are subject to revision–nevertheless, since inquiry is actually guided by latent knowledge, discovery, too, is possible: Dominnic Scott admits that Socrates certainly makes it sound as if recollection involves the bringing out of truths that are already latent in one’s soulhe argues that what recollection actually amounts to for Socrates is the ability to follow a sequential argument.
Scott contends that once Socrates takes up the question of virtue’s teachability, Meno shows signs of having improved: Scott is prone to making this latter move; I discuss a further example three paragraphs below.